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# Raffles and British Policy in the Indian Archipelago, 1811-1816\*

by JOHN BASTIN  
(Received February 1953)

## I

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the Dutch in the East came to realise that their English rivals had grown too strong for them, and that it was only their territorial possessions and treaties in the Indies which prevented a serious breach in the spice monopoly.<sup>1</sup> The English themselves still cast envious eyes on the Celebes. "It is there", the Directors informed Hillsborough in 1780,<sup>2</sup> "that the East India Company desire to have an Establishment, as it would secure them a share in the most valuable of all Commercial Branches, the Spices". But in the next forty years, increasing in emphasis after the limitation to the Company's charter in 1813, British commercial policy began to shift, as the lucrative China trade developed.<sup>3</sup>

During the closing decades of the century British trade with Canton trebled,<sup>4</sup> and British ships engaged in the trade outnumbered the ships of all other European nations combined.<sup>5</sup> The importance of the trade was impressed on Macartney in 1793 before he set out for Canton. Dundas told him that by the sale of British and Indian manufactures, China furnished yearly re-

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\* This paper is by no means exhaustive. It aims merely at providing some sort of background to Raffles's forward policy in Borneo and the other Eastern Islands during the years he was in Java. His relations with Palembang, and his later conflicts with the Dutch, will be dealt with in a subsequent paper. In some cases the spelling of place-names follows the practice of the period, i.e. the beginning of the nineteenth century, to avoid a conflict between the text and quotations from contemporary documents: Sooloo, Lingga as *Lingen*, and Bangka as *Banca*; Riau (Bentan) takes the English version *Rhio*. On the other hand, for clarity, Kutei, Pasir and Pontianak follow the current Eastern Archipelago Pilot.

1 Report of the Commissioners-General to the Directors. July 4, 1795, De Jonge, J. K. J. and van Deventer, M. L., *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag over Java*, (The Hague, 1862-88), XII, 349.

2 Directors E. I. C. to Lord Hillsborough, August 19, 1780. *Home Miscellaneous Series*, (India Office), 146, (5), cited by Harlow, V. T., *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793*, (London, 1952), I, 40.

3 Professor Harlow, (*Ibid.*, 64,) places the shift as early as 1763.

4 Pritchard, E. H. *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750-1800*, (Washington, 1936), 144.

5 See the figures of shipping for 1786, for example, in Morse, H. B., *The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, 1635-1834*, (O.U.P., 1926-29), II, 119.

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sources for the European investment of no less than £1,400,000.<sup>6</sup> While the Chinese Emperor did little to encourage the trade,<sup>7</sup> it nevertheless continued to expand.<sup>8</sup>

Tea was by far the most important commodity in the trade, and for the British, it was also the most lucrative.<sup>9</sup> During the seventeen years following 1793, the Company's India and China goods had sold for £103 millions sterling, and of this £55 millions had resulted from the sale of tea.<sup>10</sup> In exchange for the tea, the Company and country ships carried to Canton woollens, iron, Indian cotton, spices, pepper and sandalwood. By the turn of the century, however, Indian cotton dominated the market, and together with metals and British woollens<sup>11</sup>, left an insignificant place for spices.<sup>12</sup> When Raffles appeared in the East the spice trade was only a minor factor in the formulation of British commercial policy.<sup>13</sup>

The great hindrance to British trade in Canton was the monopoly enjoyed by the Hong Merchants.<sup>14</sup> According to one account ships trading to China found Canton as difficult to enter as Heaven, and as difficult to get out of as Chancery.<sup>15</sup> In the 1760's Alexander Dalrymple had attempted to meet the difficulty by establishing at Balembangan an entrepot centre where the British could trade with Chinese merchants unhampered by restrictions.<sup>16</sup> The Balembangan establishment was also designed to capture some of the Island trade, and so add cloves, nutmegs and cinnamon to the China consignment.<sup>17</sup>

6 Instructions to Lord Macartney, September 8, 1792, *Ibid.*, II, 233.

On Macartney's Embassy and its results, see pp. 213 et seq.

7 See the Answer of the Emperor of China to the King of England, *Ibid.*, II, 247-52.

8 The Secret Commercial Committee of the Company claimed at the beginning of 1816 that during the preceding thirty years the Company's trade with Canton had increased more than four fold. *Ibid.*, III, 290.

9 Parkinson C. N. "The East India Trade", Chapter VII, in *The Trade Winds, A Study of British Overseas Trade during the French Wars 1793-1815*, (London, 1948), 142.

10 Parkinson, C. N., *Trade in the Eastern Seas 1793-1813*. (C.U.P., 1937), 96. The Company sent from 18 to 20 ships to Canton every year, and during Raffles's administration of Java were fetching some 30 million pounds of tea. Morse, *op. cit.*, III, 290.

11 See Pritchard, E. H. *op. cit.*, 391 et seq.

12 Pepper continued to play some part in the Company's China investment. *Ibid.*, Appendix III, 393.

13 Even in the home market spices made up only a small percentage of the Company's sales. See Parkinson, C. N., *Trade in the Eastern Seas*, 97.

14 Harlow, V. T., *op. cit.*, 67, 71.

15 Charles Reade, cited by Parkinson, C. N., *Trade in the Eastern Seas*, 58.

16 On Dalrymple see Harlow, V. T., *op. cit.*, pp. 70 seq., and Willi, J., *The Early Relations of England with Borneo to 1805*, (Langensalza, 1922), pp. 34 seq.

17 Forrest T., *A Voyage to New Guinea, and the Moluccas, from Balam-bangan*, (London, 1780, second edit.,) 2.

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The British quest for spices had a lingering death. The desire for a share in the trade was strong enough twenty years after the failure of the Balembangan venture for an expedition under Rainier to be despatched to the Moluccas. The Directors needed no advice from Captain Lennon to persuade them that the captured spice trade should be confined to Company ships.<sup>18</sup> After two centuries of striving they had at last achieved their ambition — a monopoly of the spices. But it took them very much less time to realise that the high profits of the 17th and 18th centuries were no longer obtainable. By November 1802 they outlined a new scheme for the commerce of the Indian Islands, and the spice trade of the Moluccas formed no part of it. They stated that because spices were grown elsewhere in the East, the Moluccas could never again be used by the Dutch to enforce a world monopoly. The British establishment was therefore no longer necessary.<sup>19</sup> On May 3, 1803, the British Resident at Amboina, R. J. Farquhar, was instructed to leave, and proceed to Balembangan.<sup>20</sup> That island was to serve as a military and naval establishment,<sup>21</sup> but Wellesley was careful to indicate for the benefit of the Directors, that Balembangan also provided certain “commercial advantages”.<sup>22</sup>

After an inauspicious beginning, the settlement came to nothing. Farquhar received orders to abandon,<sup>23</sup> what Crawford later described as, that “sterile, uninhabited, and . . . most piratical and barbarous neighbourhood of the whole Archipelago”.<sup>24</sup> The disappointed Farquhar bluntly reprimanded the Government in his last despatch from Prince of Wales Island for its “indifference” to piracy in those seas. For Farquhar ascribed to piracy “the cause of the British settlements heretofore formed by the Honourable Company, to the eastward of the Bay of Bengal, having ended almost invariably in a tragical manner”.<sup>25</sup> On the day that this despatch was penned, Raffles arrived at Prince of

18 Lennon, Captain, W. C., *Journal of an Expedition to the Molucca Islands under the Command of Admiral Rainier, etc.*, *European MSS (Minor Collections)* (India Office), E. 74. Also printed in the *J.S.B.R.A.S.*, VII, 51-74; and in J. E. Heeres's article “Eene Engelsche lezing omtrent de verovering van Banda en Amboin in 1796 etc.,” in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde van Ned.-Indië*, (1908), Vol. 60, 249-365.

19 *Board's Collection*, (India Office), November 2, 1802, cited by Willi, J., *op. cit.*, 119.

20 *Bengal Foreign Consultations*, (India Office), March 15, 1803, cited *Ibid.*, 120.

21 *Ibid.*, 121.

22 *Ibid.*, 120.

23 *Political Letters to Madras*, (India Office), August 15, 1804, *Ibid.*, 133. Balembangan was finally abandoned in November, 1805.

24 Crawford, J., *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands & Adjacent Countries*, (London, 1856), 27.

25 *Bengal Public Consultations*, (India Office), December 26, 1815. N. 7, cited by Willi, J., *op. cit.*, 134.

Wales Island as the new Government's Assistant Secretary. Farquhar's despatch was one of the first official documents he ever read in the East, and he took its lesson to heart.<sup>26</sup> From Farquhar too he probably imbibed the enthusiasm which was to result in another attempt to settle Balembangan eight years later.

By the time Raffles was in a position to carry out such schemes, however, the only appeal he could make to justify them was the importance of the trade in the islands. But of this trade the Directors had wearied, especially after 1813 when they could no longer insist on monopoly rights. Their experience of the failure of the pepper cultivation at Bencoolen,<sup>27</sup> and of the limited opportunities presented for the disposal of coffee in the continental markets,<sup>28</sup> had convinced them that Java was of little use to them. The Moluccas had fallen in 1796 but no attempt was made to wrest Java from the crumbling power of the Dutch when this would have been relatively easy. Pellew in 1807 had estimated that he needed only 2,000 men to accomplish the task, but these he was refused. He had instead to content himself with an attack on Dutch shipping in the Batavia Roads and with a futile raid on Gresik.<sup>29</sup>

The policy of the Government was no doubt conditioned by the Directors' objections to Java. Castlereagh in 1805, when Secretary of State for the Colonial and War Department, and President of the Board of Control, had positively forbidden the Indian Government from any ventures Eastwards.<sup>30</sup> When, however, Bengal grew restless with the arrival in Java early in 1808 of a Marshal of the French army in the person of Willem Daendels, a Java expedition began to find support at home. But it was not until two years later, when the Netherlands lost its last semblance

26 Raffles, Thomas Stamford, *History of Java*, (London, 1817), I, 231.

27 The Court of Directors wrote to the Gov.-in-Council, Prince of Wales Island, April 18, 1805: "As a Commercial Establishment, Bencoolen has become of no importance. The only produce of it, Pepper, is a losing concern to the Company... It has no value in a political view..." *Straits Settlement Records*, (India Office), 186. See also Wright, A., & Read, T. H., *The Malay Peninsula*, (London, 1912), 46-7.

28 Java coffee sold well on the continent during the early years of the Napoleonic War, especially after the revolt of the slaves in Haiti had ruined the West Indian coffee production. But after 1807, until almost the end of Raffles's period in Java, the coffee market was very limited. See Vlekke, B. H. M., *Nusantara*, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1943), 228-9.

29 Parkinson, C. N., *Edward Pellew: Viscount Exmouth*, (London, 1934), 374, 378. Pellew was given 500 men instead of the 2,000 demanded.

30 Minto to Sir Edward Pellew, November 1, 1807, in Minto, *The Countess of, Lord Minto in India*, (London, 1880), 53. Minto stated that there was some ministerial support for an expedition against Java.

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of independence by being annexed to France, that the British Government decided to act. As Minto wrote in January, 1811<sup>31</sup>,

From the first decided establishment of the French Authority and even influence in Holland, we have regarded the expulsion of the Dutch power from Java and generally from the Eastern Seas as one of those essential objects of National policy, on which the British Arms might perhaps be more beneficially employed, than on any other. It is evident indeed that recent events in Europe, as they affect the United provinces alone, increase in a high degree both the importance and the urgency of extinguishing in the Island of Java, a power which is now formally as well as substantially directed by French Counsels, and the Seat of which is in fact a province of that new Empire.

Even so, the Home Government gave preference to expeditions against Bourbon and Mauritius. Minto believed that it was his letter of January 23, 1810 to the Secret Committee which forced the decision to invade Java.<sup>32</sup> But the decision was made by the Home Government against the determined wishes of the Company.<sup>33</sup> A compromise was effected by which the Company's forces were to be employed, but once the French were defeated, Java was to be handed over to the natives. Because the Company's resources were utilized, Minto's instructions went through the usual Company channels. The Secret Committee in a despatch of August 31, 1810<sup>34</sup> gave him permission to undertake the reduction of Java after the successful termination of hostilities against Mauritius and Bourbon. The Committee was, however, careful to qualify these instructions.

"It is by no means our wish," they wrote, "or that of His Majesty's Government, that they [the enemy's settlements to the Eastward] should be permanently occupied as British Colonies; . . . We merely wish to expel the Enemy from all their Settlements in those Seas. . . . wishing to leave the possession of these Settlements to the occupation of the Natives".

31 Minto to Gov.-in-Council, Fort St. George, January 17, 1811, *Factory Records, Java*, (India Office), 11. (Java Factory Records hereafter cited as *Java*.) A similar letter of Minto's is cited in van Deventer, M. L., *Het Nederlandsch Gezag over Java en Onderhoorigheden sedert 1811*, (The Hague, 1891), p. II.

32 Loc. cit.

33 There is a good deal of evidence to show this. See the letter from the Directors to Lord Bathurst, October 25, 1816, in van Deventer, M. L., *op. cit.*, 115; also p. II. The Company was very wary about engaging in the expeditions against Bourbon, Mauritius and Java. The Chairs in a Minute of June 21, 1810 expressed the view that the Government had not played fair with the Company over the expenses for the expeditions against the Spice Islands and Ceylon, and they agreed to undertake the Bourbon and Mauritius expedition only on Dundas's assurance that the public would bear the costs of the venture. Minute by the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman, June 14, 1810, & Dundas to the Chairs, June 25, 1810, all in *Minutes of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 1806-1824*, (India Office), 160.

34 Printed as a footnote, van Deventer, M. L., *op. cit.*, 4-5.

Minto's refusal to comply with these orders "because morally, impossible",<sup>35</sup> and his establishment of a civil government with Raffles at its head, brought only grudging support from the Directors. They regretted

the necessity imposed on this country of extending its territories in that quarter of the World, and...[were not] very sanguine as to the resources of the Island being fully adequate to defray the expense of its civil and military establishments...<sup>36</sup>

In quite a different mood was the news received in other quarters. Liverpool informed Auchmuty that the capture of Java had afforded "the greatest satisfaction" to the Prince Regent.<sup>37</sup> Shortly afterwards the Directors too, probably because they had been assured that the island was soon to be made a crown colony, estimated "very highly the political and commercial benefits which are likely to accrue to the Nation and to the East India Company from the conquest of the last of the Enemy's Settlements in the Eastern Seas..."<sup>38</sup>

But when Raffles attempted to consolidate what he considered those political and commercial benefits to be, he came into immediate conflict with his superiors at home. Commerce in the Archipelago, for what it was worth, was welcomed, but the political connections which he wished to develop with the native states were strongly disavowed. And when this native trade became even less important in comparison with the developing China trade, and Raffles failed to make Java self-supporting,<sup>39</sup> his persistent appeals to retain the island at the peace made very little impression on the hard-headed gentlemen of Leadenhall Street. They were very willing that the Dutch should be restored to their island possessions,<sup>40</sup> so long as the Cape was in British hands, and they were allowed a free run to Canton. Only among the British cotton interests and the private trade was there any

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35 Minto to the Secret Committee, December 6, 1811, *Ibid.*, 6.

36 Despatch of December 23, 1811 to Minto, *Board's Drafts of Secret Letters to India*, (India Office), 4, No. 77. I have cited drafts only where they have been signed by the Directors.

37 Liverpool to Auchmuty, December, 1811, in *Java Government Gazette*, October 3, 1812.

38 Despatch of March 6, 1812 to Minto, *Board's Drafts of Secret Letters to India*, 4, No. 80.

39 See Hastings on the drain Java caused on the Company's resources, Bute, The Marchioness of. *The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings*, K. G., (London, 1858), I, 40-1; & the Directors of the Company to Raffles, May, 1815, cited by Coupland, R., *Raffles 1781-1826*, (O.U.P., 1934), 58.

40 Section IV *infra*.

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support for the Island trade.<sup>41</sup> Raffles's forward policy in the Archipelago during the years 1811-1816, when he tried to establish a permanent British sphere of influence by a system of subsidiary alliances with native chieftains, never found support. The Company realised from its experience on the Indian continent that these alliances were always a cause of trouble, and ultimately resulted in further acquisition of territory. Indeed it is fair to conclude that Raffles's founding of Singapore in 1819, although it provoked an apparent storm of dissent at home, found more ready support than did his actions during his Java administration. The hostility which the taking of Singapore caused on the one hand,<sup>42</sup> but the reluctance to surrender it on the other, is pointed to by the Dutch as further evidence of the Machiavellian ways of British policy in the East. Canning's justification of the retention of the island does little but confirm their views.<sup>43</sup> But while Singapore was in some ways the climax of Raffles's efforts, in the early years his hopes of consolidating British power lay further Eastwards.

## II

The tremendous possibilities which the conquest of Java opened to the extension of British influence in the Archipelago was apparent to Raffles from the beginning

"The annexation of Java and the Eastern Isles to our Indian empire" he wrote to Minto in 1811, "opens to the English nation views of so enlarged a nature, as to seem equally to demand and justify a bolder policy, both of a commercial and political kind, than we could have lately contemplated."<sup>44</sup>

In his despatches before the Java expedition set sail, Raffles explained the nature of this policy. While he condemned certain restrictive aspects of the Dutch economic policy, the idea of monopoly was not to be abandoned. For by controlling the Eastern Islands and India, Britain would possess such an "Empire of Colonies"<sup>45</sup> that monopoly rights could be insisted upon. British traders who had formerly entered the Archipelago as smugglers

41 Wright, H. R. C., "The Anglo-Dutch Dispute in the East, 1814-1824", in *The Economic History Review*, (1950-1), III, pp. 229 seq. shows the importance of the Archipelago trade to the British cotton and private interests.

42 See Board to Gov.-Gen., August 14, 1819, *Board's Drafts of Secret Letters to India*, 5, No. 135.

43 Cited by Norman, H. D. *Levysohn, De Britsche Heerchappij over Java en Onderhoorigheden*, (1811-1816), (The Hague, 1857), 119.

44 Raffles to Minto, June 10, 1811, in Raffles, *Lady. Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles*, (London, 1830), 69. (Hereafter cited as *Widow's Memoir*.)

45 Raffles, T. S., *Memoir on the value, political and financial, of the Dutch possessions in the East., etc., May [1811]*, in *Raffles Collection*, (India Office), II, 3.

should still be restricted — for unless a monopoly of the Eastern commerce were insisted upon, how was England to maintain “a war which is every year draining her of her best resources . . . .?”<sup>46</sup>

“It may . . . be fairly inferred that it is as essential to the Commerce and Welfare of the Eastern Islands as to the support and prosperity of our more permanent Possessions, that the Eastern Trade should be subject to certain restrictions,” he concluded his long Memoir of May 1811, “and that altho[ugh] the Dutch have been generally condemned by us for the severe restrictions and monopolies they have adopted, yet there are many of their Regulations which we must approve while their general principles of Government and policy cannot easily and without actual experience be controverted. By continuing therefore until we see cause to alter all existing Restrictions and Regulations for Trade, we shall only do what prudence, caution and our own interest dictate.”<sup>47</sup>

Free trade for Raffles was a thing of the future. What he regarded as a liberal element in his economic policy was the idea of establishing a uniform system of regulations throughout the whole Archipelago, by means of fixed ports.<sup>48</sup> These would prevent Arabs, Chinese, Americans and other “unprincipled adventurers”<sup>49</sup> from undermining British interests in the Islands.

While his economic policy closely followed the Dutch, his political ideas, he considered, were “radically different”. At Malacca he had strongly supported the policy previously advanced by Light and Scott for intervention in Kedah, and even suggested that the cession of the whole Malay Peninsula was possible.<sup>50</sup> In the Archipelago itself the British were to base their policy on a different basis from the divide-and-rule principle of the Dutch.

“The policy which I conjecture we shall subsequently find it proper to follow,” he told Minto, “is exactly the opposite of this. We may, with great facility, and without much trouble, employ our influence and mediation to heal the dissensions of the native princes, to establish firmly ancient authorities, check innovations, and prevent civil wars as much as lies in our power. . . .”<sup>51</sup>

With respect to Celebes and Jelolo, he thought such a policy would create powerful centres of opposition to any other European power which attempted to penetrate the area, and would “tend to render our influence permanent in these regions, and indepen-

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46 Loc. cit.

47 Loc. cit.

48 Raffles to Minto, June 10, 1811, *Widow's Memoir*, pp. 74 seq.

49 *Ibid.*, 76.

50 Raffles to Minto, (n.d.) in *Widow's Memoir*, 49-56.

51 Raffles to Minto, June 10, 1811, *Ibid.*, 64-5.

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dent of any arrangement which may take place subsequent to a general peace".<sup>52</sup>

This last sentence gives a key to understanding Raffles's ideas of establishing British power in the Indies. He realised before Java had fallen that it might be restored to the Dutch on a cessation of hostilities in Europe. He therefore divided the Archipelago into nine parts and in each carefully examined the claims of the Dutch.<sup>53</sup> Where these claims were not strong he thought the British should establish with the native chiefs "intimate connections, by treaty".<sup>54</sup> He believed that this was the best policy to pursue whether Britain held her island conquests, or they were later handed back to the Dutch.

It was in order to secure British hegemony in the Archipelago that Raffles suggested the idea of the Protectorate.<sup>55</sup> Every native chieftain was to be approved by the British authorities, and made answerable for the good government of his territories. The most powerful of the chieftains in the Islands were to receive support, but the minor ones were to be suppressed. This suppression was not a negative policy, for Raffles ascribed to the rise of small and unlawful states the Archipelago's greatest curse—piracy.

Nothing can tend so effectually to the suppression of Piracy, to the encouragement and extension of lawful commerce, and to the civilization of the Inhabitants of the Eastern Islands, as affording a steady support to the established Native Sovereigns, and assisting them in the maintenance of their just rights and authority over their several Chiefs. . . .<sup>56</sup>

It was in an effort to meet the menace of piracy that Raffles was forced into a forward policy off the west coast of Borneo. It is obvious from the pattern of this policy that he was attempting to revive the ideas of Alexander Dalrymple.

Even as late as the 'nineties Dalrymple had continued to urge the necessity of an entrepot centre at Balembangan,<sup>57</sup> and Raffles was no doubt thoroughly familiar with the essays in the *Oriental Repertory*. Further, as we have already seen, Raffles probably received a first-hand account of Balembangan from Farquhar at Penang, and from him had learnt the lesson that the

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52 *Ibid.*, 66.

53 *Ibid.*, 70.

54 *Ibid.*, 70.

55 *Ibid.*, 71. On the importance of this idea, see Coupland, Sir R., *Raffles of Singapore*, (London, 1946), 28.

56 Raffles to Gov.-in-Council, Prince of Wales Island, February 18, 1814, *Raffles Collection*, 10, No. 1.

57 "Some Notes concerning the Trade to China", in *Oriental Repertory*, (London, 1793-4), II, 321-2. By this time Dalrymple's ideas regarding Balembangan were changing, and showed a preference for a trading station in Cochin-China.

success of British establishments in the Eastern Seas necessitated a rigid control of piracy.<sup>58</sup> An important part of Raffles's schemes in Borneo was therefore connected with an anti-piracy campaign.

Raffles thought that the Dutch claims to Borneo were weak and the British rights strong.<sup>59</sup> It was for this reason that he concentrated his attention on that island. It would prove a suitable place where British power could be established if the Dutch returned to Java. Why Raffles set his main hopes on Borneo can be partly explained. When he assumed the Government of Java, he was a young man eager to learn, and willing to listen. Raffles was always a person who was easily influenced, and the fact that he was deluged with a mass of information regarding Borneo from J. Burn at Pontianak,<sup>60</sup> and Alexander Hare, who had trading contacts with Banjermassin, must have resolved him in any course he had already decided before he left Malacca. The Sultan of Pontianak had made requests in 1803 and 1810 for British assistance,<sup>61</sup> and repeated overtures had come from the Sultan of Borneo Proper.<sup>62</sup> Before the Java expedition set out, Raffles had addressed letters of friendship to the Sultans of Pontianak and Sambas informing them of the intentions of the British. But if Raffles in 1811 had any doubts about the value of Borneo to the British, such doubts were soon dispelled in the following year, when he received a comprehensive report on the island from J. Hunt who had spent part of 1810 trading at Sooloo. This report,<sup>63</sup> containing as it did much false information,<sup>64</sup> undoubtedly made a great impression on Raffles.<sup>65</sup> Hunt made two

58 As Farquhar was an influence on Raffles's ideas regarding Borneo, there appears to have been an almost continuous pattern in the efforts made by Dalrymple, Farquhar, Raffles and Brooke to establish British stations there. Brooke, who often repeated his indebtedness to Raffles's ideas, had as his secretary Hugh Low. It was the latter, according to Sir Hugh Clifford, who "reimported" into Malaya the Raffles's traditions later in the century. See Clifford, Sir Hugh, *In Court & Kampong*, (London, 1927), Preface, 12-3.

59 See Raffles's letter to the Secret Committee, July 3, 1818, in van Deventer, M. L., op. cit., 258, and *History of Java*, op. cit., I, 239.

60 Raffles used the information which Burn sent in his despatches to Minto, (*Widow's Memoir*, 47-8) and Leyden used it for his "Sketch of Borneo" in *Transactions of the Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences*, (Batavia, 1814). Leyden's "Sketch" is reprinted in Moor, J. H., *Notices of the Indian Archipelago, and Adjacent Countries*, (Singapore, 1837), Appendix, 93-109. A number of Burn's letters to Raffles are in the *Raffles Collection*, (India Office).

61 Willi, J., op. cit. 134.

62 Loc. cit.

63 "Sketch of Borneo or Pulo Kalamantan", in Moor, J. H., op. cit., Appendix, 12-30.

64 See Crawford, J. op. cit., 407.

65 As it apparently did on Brooke too. It is printed as an Appendix to Keppel, H., *The Expedition to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido*, (London, 1847), I, 382-429.

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appeals which could not be resisted. One was for the development of the untold wealth of Borneo,<sup>66</sup> the other for the civilization of the inhabitants.

Should so fortunate an occurrence ever fall to the lot of Borneo; should a strong and a wise government ever be established on her shores. . . . such a government, in a short series of years, would behold, as if by magic, a paradise burst from her wilds, see cultivation: smile upon her jungles, and hail a vast and increasing population, blessing the hand that awoke them to life, to happiness, and to prosperity.<sup>67</sup>

According to Hunt the best way to proceed in this humanitarian task was to engage in a rigorous campaign against the Borneo pirates. The river estuaries of Sambas, Borneo Proper and Pasir should be made safe, and British stations established there.

Raffles did not have long to wait to show his enthusiasm for undertaking positive action against piracy. On October 11, 1812 Captain J. Bowen of H.M.S. *Phoenix*, then in the Batavia Roads, addressed an appeal to Raffles for one hundred European soldiers to act as marines in an attack on Sambas.<sup>68</sup> The port was then in the control of the Sultan's son, Pengeran Anom, the most ruthless and successful of the Eastern pirates, a man whom Hunt had described as having "out heroded Herod" in his atrocities.<sup>69</sup> Bowen's idea was simply to conduct a naval campaign against the Pengeran's stronghold.<sup>70</sup> On the next day Raffles placed the one hundred men at Bowen's disposal,<sup>71</sup> because the "continued and increasing depredations of these pirates. . . . renders it imperative on the British Government to suppress them by the strongest means within its reach." . . .<sup>72</sup> Gillespie was, however, somewhat reluctant to permit his men to leave Java,<sup>73</sup> but troops of the 78th Regiment in charge of Captain McVean, were eventually placed under Bowen's command. When the attack failed, Raffles by astute diplomacy managed to place the responsibility of the expedition on Bowen's shoulders, and escaped censure from Bengal.<sup>74</sup>

But Raffles had decided to break the power of the Sambas pirates, and this he accomplished in June of the following year.

66 He drew attention to a gold mine in North Borneo, (p. 10), "the most valuable diamond mine in the world" not far from Pontianak, (loc. cit.), and to the important pearl fisheries at Sooloo. (p. 20).

67 *Ibid.*, 22.

68 Bowen to Raffles, October 11, 1812, in *Replies to Charges Preferred by Gillespie against Raffles*, 319. (The collection of documents has no title. I have used this one for convenience. Hereafter it will be cited as *Gillespie Documents*.)

69 Hunt, *op. cit.*, 24. See also *History of Java*, I, 222.

70 *Widow's Memoir*, 198-9.

71 Raffles to Bowen, October 12, 1812, *Gillespie Documents*, 320.

72 *Loc. cit.*

73 J. Nixon to C. Assey, March 12, 1814, *Ibid.*, 322.

74 Minto to Raffles, (n.d.), *Ibid.*, 318.

In that month a powerful detachment of troops of the 14th Regiment left Java under the command of Lieut.-Colonel J. Watson.<sup>75</sup> On the 22nd the troops arrived off Sambas to find a squadron of His Majesty's ships under Captain Sayer anchored off-shore. On the following day stores were landed, and on the 25th the troops were moving up the river towards the stronghold. Previous to the advance, a letter had been despatched by Sayer and Watson to the Sultan demanding him "to surrender the defences of Sambas, also the Pangeran Anom and his piratical adherents".<sup>76</sup> But the Sultan had already left the fort and the letter was received by Pengeran Anom himself. The troops stormed and carried the stronghold early on the 28th, killing one hundred and fifty natives, including the brother of the Sultan, the eldest son of the Pengeran, and twelve other chieftains. Pengeran Anom, however, managed to escape.

Following the destruction of Sambas, Raffles decided to use its example on the other piratical chiefs of Borneo. For this purpose he thought it would be advisable to appoint an Agent to visit their ports to offer the protection of the British Government on condition of their abandoning piracy. Captain D. Mackay of H.M.S. *Malacca* had in July 1813, before his return from Sambas, offered his services to Raffles in carrying out raids along the Borneo coast, and in cultivating "a good understanding with the Inhabitants,"<sup>77</sup> but Raffles decided that Captain Sayer of H.M.S. *Leda* was a better person to accomplish such a mission.<sup>78</sup> Mackay was promised the task in the event of Sayer refusing it. However, in August Raffles decided to despatch an accredited officer from Java on the mission. The officer was Captain B. C. Garnham, one of Raffles's closest adherents, and honorary aide-de-camps. He was instructed to board Mackay's ship as "Political Agent"<sup>79</sup> in order to secure the safety of navigation in the Eastern Seas. He was first to proceed to Sambas and attempt to conciliate the Sultan, and make him dependent on the British authorities. But there was to be no attempt to make Sambas a British settlement. Raffles claimed that the reduction of that place had only been effected in order to suppress piracy, and "was unconnected with every idea of extension of territory".<sup>80</sup> The policy to be followed, Garnham was told, was to bring about

75 Watson to Raffles, July 3, 1813 in *Java Government Gazette*, July 24, 1813.

76 Loc. cit.

77 Mackay to Raffles, July 21, 1813, *Java 37, Separate Department Proceedings*, (India Office), August 9, 1813.

78 Raffles to Mackay, August 9, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, August 9, 1813.

79 Instructions to Captain Garnham, August 10, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, August 18, 1813. See van Deventer, M. L., op. cit., xlv for a short account of Garnham's mission.

80 Loc. cit.

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the confinement of foreign trade to "certain acknowledged and regulated Ports".<sup>81</sup> In Borneo these were Banjermassin, Pontianak and Borneo Proper (Brunei). Minor ports dependent upon them could later be opened, and the country gradually brought under control. In order to carry out these ideas, Raffles proposed to appoint a British Agent at Pontianak, where the Sultan had expressed a desire for a British connection.<sup>82</sup> Garnham was to deliver a letter to him informing him that Alexander Hare would arrive at Pontianak shortly, from Banjermassin, in order to adjust the disputed boundaries between the Sultan of Sambas and himself.

Garnham was then to visit Sambas, and after consultation with Captain Sayer, was empowered to settle the provisional government of the country. There was to be no objection to raising the existing Sultan to the head of that government, so long as he agreed not to afford further shelter to pirates. Garnham was strictly forbidden from entering into any negotiations with the Chinese settled between Sambas and Pontianak.<sup>83</sup> From Sambas he was to proceed to Borneo Proper, where the Sultan was well disposed to the British. Here Garnham was to afford him support against the pirates who infested the rivers in his territory, and he was to be warned of the fate of Sambas if he failed to comply with these proposals.<sup>84</sup>

A letter containing similar warnings was addressed to the Sultan of Kutei.<sup>85</sup> In addition Garnham was to issue proclamations warning the natives of the penalties associated with piracy, and declaring the ports of Sambas, Kutei and Pasir to be "in a state of Piracy and Hostility".<sup>86</sup>

In a letter to Sayer of the *Leda*, Raffles explained the nature of Garnham's mission, and indicated that it would have to be followed by a similar one to Lingen (Lingga), Rhio and Trengganu.<sup>87</sup> Raffles had already requested Captain Elliot, who was

81 Loc. cit.

82 J. Hunt appears to have been Commercial Agent at Pontianak during most of 1813. See Haan, F. de, "Personalia der periode van het Engelsch bestuur over Java 1811-16". in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Ned.-Indie*, Vol. 92, (1935), 585.

83 Hunt in his "Sketch of Borneo", op. cit., 18, stated that there were some 30,000 Chinese settled in the Sambas area.

84 Raffles to the Sultan of Borneo Proper, August 9, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, August 18, 1813.

85 Raffles to the Sultan of Kutei, August 10, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, August 18, 1813. *Coatai* of this period = the (*Sungei*) Kutei of modern maps. *Passier* = (*Sungei*) Pasir. In both cases the territories of the Sultanates were centred round a river (Malay, *Sungei*) from which they derived their names.

86 Proclamation dated August 9, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, August 18, 1813.

87 Raffles to Sayer, August 9, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, August 18, 1813.

in charge of part of the British Eastern squadron, to visit Rhio and Lingen.<sup>88</sup> He now asked Sayer to undertake a mission to Trengganu.<sup>89</sup> For this reason he enclosed to the Sultan there a letter of a similar nature to those addressed to the Borneo chieftains. According to Raffles, Trengganu had lapsed into piratical ways about 1809.<sup>90</sup> The Sultan, who was much given to dissipation, had permitted a worthless nephew, Rajah Mansur, to establish himself with a pirate following at Dungun on the coast some forty miles south of Kuala Trengganu. The object of the Trengganu mission was to rid the Eastern Peninsula of pirates altogether. In the event of Sayer refusing to undertake the mission, Garnham himself was to touch at Trengganu on his return from Borneo.<sup>91</sup> However, this part of the mission was not accomplished nor could Garnham proceed to Sooloo, Mindanao and Macassar as originally planned. The object behind this part of the mission was Raffles's contention, outlined in a letter to Mackay in August 19,<sup>92</sup> that the appearance of some of His Majesty's ships off trouble spots in the Archipelago would have "a beneficial effect" in bringing piracy under control. A display of force would be particularly useful off Macassar and its dependencies, and off Kupang, on Timor. The other stations at Salayar and in the Celebes, he regarded of little importance. Bali and Banca he thought were worth an occasional visit, but the other places in the Archipelago he did not consider of "sufficient importance to deserve notice at present".<sup>93</sup>

But the lateness of the season caused Mackay to warn against proceeding on this part of the mission,<sup>94</sup> and Garnham was instructed to go no further than North Borneo.<sup>95</sup> The whole idea of the mission was that it should be a peaceful one. Garnham was accompanied by a force not sufficient to engage in hostilities, but strong enough to command respect.<sup>96</sup> Raffles explained to Admiral Hood that it was also designed to find out if a similar expedition to that sent against Sambas would be needed to impress upon the native chiefs the firm intentions of the British in

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88 Loc. cit. *Lingen* now rendered *Lingga*.

89 Loc. cit.

90 Memorandum on Trangano (Trengganu), August 9, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, August 18, 1813. Raffles was not quite correct: the worthless fellow was Tengku Mansur, the Sultan's younger brother, and later his successor as Sultan Mansur II.

91 Raffles to Captain Mackay, August 18, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, August 18, 1813.

92 *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, August 23, 1813.

93 Loc. cit.

94 Garnham to Assey, August 25, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, September 23, 1813.

95 Raffles to Mackay, August 18, 1813, *op. cit.*

96 Raffles to Minto, September 23, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, September 25, 1813.

stamping out piracy in the Eastern Seas.<sup>97</sup> But on no account was the mission to extend British territory — “the object... is solely and exclusively confined to the abolition of Piracy, without any views whatever to aggrandizement or Territory.”<sup>98</sup>

On August 25, Garnham addressed Raffles's letters to the Sultans of Kutei and Pasir via Hare at Banjermassin.<sup>99</sup> The *Malacca* with Garnham on board then set out from Semarang, and arrived off Pontianak on September 5,<sup>100</sup> where the Sultan agreed to the wishes of the British Government. Five days later Garnham was at Sambas, where he learnt that the Sultan was a week's journey up river at a place “not far from Serawah”. Garnham despatched a letter to him offering the protection of the British Government but on the 14th, not waiting for a reply, set out himself for Sarawak. Here an address, similar to that sent to the Sultan of Pontianak, was sent to the local Pengeran. A week after the *Malacca* was lying off Borneo Proper. Garnham personally delivered Raffles's letters and proclamations to the Sultan, who promised to circulate the proclamations and enforce the regulations against piracy.<sup>101</sup> Garnham informed him that the Borneo trade was to be restricted to three fixed ports, one of which was the Sultan's own. The only objection the Sultan raised to this proposal was that he possessed little trade in any case.

Garnham was back off Sambas on October 10, and sent another letter to the Sultan. The latter eventually appeared, and a Treaty was signed on the 23rd by which the Sultan was given recognition by the British, and afforded protection.<sup>102</sup> On his part, the Sultan agreed to enforce the piracy regulations.

So far as it went, Garnham's mission appears to have satisfied Raffles, although it was unfortunately marred by the unfriendly relations which existed between Garnham and Mackay.<sup>103</sup> Raffles informed the Secret Committee of the mission in a despatch of September 21, 1813.

It has been my opinion (he wrote<sup>104</sup>) that the further views necessary to establish the Supremacy and influence of the British Government among the Native States in the Eastern Seas might be accomplished

97 Raffles to Sir Samuel Hood, September 23, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, September 25, 1813.

98 Raffles to Minto, September 23, 1813, *op. cit.*

99 Garnham to Assey, August 25, 1813, *op. cit.*

100 Report of Captain B. C. Garnham, November 15, 1813, *Java 40 Separate Dependencies Consultations*, (India Office), February 5, 1814.

101 *Loc. cit.*

102 Treaty with the Sultan of Sambas, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, February 5, 1814.

103 Various correspondence relating to the disharmony between the two men can be found in *Java*, 40.

104 *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, September 23, 1813.

by armed negotiation or that at any rate more defined and explicit information with regard to the actual [condition] of Piracy was necessary before we could be justified in having recourse to hostilities against them.

Under this impression a Political Agent has been sent to the several States on the Coast of Borneo with instructions...and I shall have the honour at a future period of stating more fully the arrangements which appear advisable for the security of commerce in the Eastern Seas, and for the extension of the British Authority therein, without any view whatever to an increase of territorial possessions or infringements on the just rights of the dependent Native States.

Although Raffles received the sanction of the Supreme Government for the military measures taken against Sambas,<sup>105</sup> Minto came down very firmly on the idea of confining the trade in the Archipelago to specific ports. In a despatch dated July 10, 1813 Minto wrote:

With respect to your projected plan of confining the Trade of the Eastern Islands to certain specific Ports, we must observe that we are not quite satisfied of the Policy of the restrictions which you intended to impose, and that we are still more inclined to doubt the competency of your Government to enforce any such restrictions as far as they may regard the Ports of the different independent Chiefs holding Territory in the Eastern Islands. We would recommend therefore that you suspend any arrangements which you have had it in contemplation to adopt for this purpose until you may be made acquainted with the determination of the Public Authorities in England, with respect to the future Administration of our Possessions in the Eastern Islands....<sup>106</sup>

Before this despatch reached Batavia, Raffles was pursuing a forward policy west of Java. On the recommendation of Captain Elliot, the projected mission to Rhio was abandoned. But on September 4, Captain MacDonald of the Company's cruiser *Aurora* left the Palembang River under instructions from Raffles, via Captain Court the British resident at Banca, to proceed to Lingen. He was instructed to inform the chiefs there of the displeasure of the Java Government caused by the recent piratical raids carried on by the Lingen natives against Banca, and their smuggling of tin.<sup>107</sup> He was to secure the release of any Banca natives seized in these raids. MacDonald reached Lingen on September 6, and on the following day presented Raffles's letter to Sultan Baroo.<sup>108</sup> The latter being under the control of the Rajah Muda of Rhio, refused to commit himself, but sent to

105 Minto to Raffles, July 10, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, October 23, 1813, & same to same, November [22], 1813 in *Widow's Memoir*, 197.

106 Minto to Raffles, July 10, 1813, *op. cit.*

107 Substance of Instructions delivered to Captain MacDonald, September 3, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, October 29, 1813.

108 Captain MacDonald to Captain Court, September 13, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, October 29, 1813.

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Rhio for instructions. On the 12th the Rajah Muda himself arrived at Lingen and readily agreed to seize any boats employed in smuggling, and to free any of his subjects who wished to leave for Banca. He denied that any slaves had been brought into Lingen or Rhio during the preceding six months. The Rajah's ready acquiescence to Raffles's wishes was due to his fear that the English were about to despatch an expedition against Lingen and Rhio.<sup>109</sup> MacDonald was therefore able to report that he had secured "the complete fulfillment of every article" of his instructions. When this was reported to Raffles, he announced his intention of establishing a British Resident at Lingen under Court's authority.<sup>110</sup>

Although Raffles had received positive orders from Bengal that he was not to engage in further negotiations with native chieftains in the Archipelago until he learnt of the wishes of the home authorities, he decided nevertheless that time was running against him. He therefore despatched J. Hunt, the expert on Borneo affairs, to Mindanao and Sooloo early in the New Year. The object was to complete that part of Garnham's mission which the monsoons had prevented the previous year. The chiefs of both places were to be informed of the establishment of the British in Java, and of the active measures which had been taken against piracy.<sup>111</sup> Hunt was to obtain as much accurate information as he could on the state of piracy and to suggest the best means of reducing it. He was given letters of introduction to the chiefs of Sooloo and Mindanao, and also one to the Sultan of Borneo Proper.<sup>112</sup> The Spanish Governor of Sambuangan was to be told of the object of the mission in so far as it related to piracy.<sup>113</sup>

In addition to the political objects of the expedition, there were also commercial ones, designed to raise favourable credit in Bengal for a depleted Java treasury. The idea was to despatch from Java a cargo which was to be disposed of by Hunt at Sooloo. Sooloo goods were then to be shipped for sale in Canton and Chinese wares were to be consigned back to Sooloo and sold for pepper and other articles suitable for the European market.<sup>114</sup>

109 Loc. cit.

110 Raffles to Captain Court, October 11, 1813, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, October 29, 1813.

111 Instructions to I. Hunt, January 20, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, May 13, 1814. (Hunt's christian name was sometimes written as Ino, at other times as John. See Haan, F. de, op. cit., 584.)

112 Loc. cit.

113 Raffles to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Sambuangan, January 20, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, May 13, 1814.

114 Instructions to Hunt, op. cit.

Raffles estimated that one hundred thousand Spanish dollars would result from these transactions.<sup>115</sup>

Hunt was to effect some arrangement with the Sultan of Sooloo so that he could continue to reside there as "an Agent on the part of the British Government",<sup>116</sup> and in this capacity he was to open a regular commercial intercourse with China and the surrounding islands. This mission was more imposing than Garnham's. Hunt was escorted on the brig *Greyhound* by the Company's cruisers *Malabar* and *Aurora*. He was also provided with a gun boat at Sooloo, and accompanied by a colonial officer and thirty-five men of the Javanese corps.<sup>117</sup> His reward was to be a commission of five per cent on the net profits of the commercial venture.<sup>118</sup>

Hunt left Sourabaya at the end of January and arrived in the the Mindanao roads on March 15, where the Sultan "hailed with joy the arrival of the English".<sup>119</sup> As early as 1762 the English had shown an interest in Mindanao. In June of that year Rear Admiral Charles Steevens had received secret instructions to give all the assistance he could, after the cessation of hostilities against Manila, to take possession of the island, and help the officers of the Company form a settlement there.<sup>120</sup> Thirteen years later Captain Forrest was granted the island of Bunwoot by the Sultan, but the failure of Dalrymple's ventures caused the Directors to lose interest in the area. However, the Sultan of Mindanao appears to have made strong efforts to secure an alliance with the English, partly to gain support against rebellious subjects, and partly to increase his trade.<sup>121</sup> In 1809 he had sent a messenger to Madras while Minto was there asking for a British connection, but Minto was evasive.<sup>122</sup> Because of the unwillingness of the British to assist him, the Sultan had been forced to call in the Spaniards from Sambuangan in 1812 to help him restore order in his territories.<sup>123</sup> While the Spaniards still continued to insist on their rights to Mindanao, Hunt met with a favourable reception from the Governor of Manila.<sup>124</sup>

115 Raffles to Court of Directors, February 11, 1814, *Java* 39, *Separate Department Proceedings*, (India Office), March 25, 1814.

116 Instructions to Hunt, *op. cit.*

117 Hunt was originally provided with an escort of 20 men, but this was later increased to 35.

118 Instructions to Hunt, *op. cit.*

119 Hunt to Raffles, March 17, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, May 13, 1814.

120 Steeven's Instructions are cited by Harlow, V. T., *op. cit.*, 22.

121 Hunt to Raffles, March 17, 1814, *op. cit.*

122 Minto to Mahomed Shah Anwar Oodeen, October 3, 1809, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, May 13, 1814.

123 Hunt to Raffles, March 17, 1814, *op. cit.*

124 Hunt, J., "Some Particulars Relating to Sulo, in the Archipelago of Felicia", in Moor, J. H., *op. cit.*, 52-3.

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To the joyful Sultan of Mindanao, Hunt explained that the British had no desire to extend their territories, nor any wish to interfere in his affairs. But apparently because the Sultan was insistent on some sort of treaty with the English, Hunt went beyond his written instructions, and suggested that the British would be willing to establish a residency in his territories.<sup>125</sup> He explained that Bunwoot Island, which had been ceded to Forrest, was not suitable for such an establishment, and proposed instead Pollock Harbour. The Sultan showed some reluctance to agree to this on the grounds that the natives at the latter place were not directly under his authority. He suggested as an alternative Balankay.<sup>126</sup> But in the Treaty which Hunt signed with him on March 17 this was left open to further negotiation.<sup>127</sup> By clause 4 of the Treaty a British Agent was permitted to reside at Mindanao, having complete jurisdiction within the Residency. In addition the British were granted the sole right of trade and half a share in perpetuity of all the Sultan's revenues, duties and imposts.

In pressing the advantages of the Treaty on Raffles, Hunt asked for an immediate decision whether the Residency should be established, for unless the Government acted quickly Hunt thought that the Sultan would be forced to ask the help of the Spaniards.<sup>128</sup> Hunt suggested that if a Residency were established a number of Chinese should be sent from the goldmines at Pontianak to instruct the natives on the ways of working gold. Some intelligent Javanese should also be sent to teach them how to manufacture indigo.

Leaving Mindanao Hunt proceeded to Sooloo arriving there on March 27. Here the English mission was received cautiously because the Sooloo people believed them to be Spaniards, who had come to punish them for the murder of a Spaniard in July of the previous year.<sup>129</sup> On the 28th Hunt proceeded ashore and presented Raffles's letters to the Sultan. He stated that the immediate object of his visit was the renewal of the treaty entered into by the late Sultan with Alexander Dalrymple in 1763. The Sultan replied that he had been only a boy when that Treaty had been concluded, and that no copy of it existed at Sooloo. After much hesitation the Sultan agreed to admit a British Resident into his

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125 Hunt to Raffles, March 17, 1814, *op. cit.*

126 *Loc. cit.*

127 Treaty between His Highness the Sultan of Magendanas, and the Honorable the British United East India Company, March 17, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, May 13, 1814.

128 Hunt to Raffles, March 17, 1814, *op. cit.*

129 Hunt to Raffles, April 2, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, May 13, 1814. See also Hunt, "Some Particulars Relating to Sulo", *op. cit.*, 52.

territories, but his chiefs positively refused to sanction this.<sup>130</sup> In an attempt to persuade a gathering of the mantris of the desirability of their agreeing to the British wishes, Hunt told them that all the other Malay states in the Archipelago had submitted to the authority of the Java Government. The reply he received was crushing. One chief stated that even if the Sooloos were pirates, the British had no right to interfere with them, and that in any case they were not Malays but Sooloo people — men capable of defending themselves. On the following day Hunt met with hostile demonstrations while pressing the Sultan for a definite answer. The negotiation became confused, but Hunt was permitted to land with his stores under the protection of some of the chiefs. On April 2, the Sultan signed a Treaty which was similar to that agreed to at Mindanao.<sup>131</sup> Article 1 confirmed Dalrymple's Treaty, which probably means that Hunt prevailed upon the Sultan to sign without the knowledge of his chiefs, or what is more likely, that he was unaware of what he was signing.

It appears from a letter which Hunt wrote to Raffles early in September,<sup>132</sup> that he remained at Sooloo for sometime selling the Java investment shipped on the *Greyhound*. But the arrival of Chinese junks, vessels from Manila, and the brig *Thainstone* from Penang caused a swamping of the local market, and Hunt's cargo sold cheaply. The *Thainstone's* cargo in fact undersold that of the *Greyhound* by fifty per cent, and Hunt himself seems to have been intimidated by the Sooloos into buying a return cargo suitable for Canton at exorbitant rates.

While he was engaged in these commercial activities, Hunt received "pressing invitatons" from Sultan Adaman of Padang — situated 16 miles south of Sooloo — to erect a British fort. This Sultan was the elder brother of the Sultan of Sooloo, and had originally been a contestant for the Sooloo throne. Hunt thought that in view of his rather unsuccessful negotiations with the Sooloos the Java Government should recognize the pretensions of Adaman, and with a suitable force establish him at Sooloo. He advised Raffles, therefore, of this course of action.

130 Hunt to Raffles, April 2, 1814, *op. cit.*

131 Treaty between His Highness Mahomed Abuid Deen, the Sultan of all the Sooloos, and the Honorable the British United East India Company of Merchants, April 2, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, May 13, 1814.

132 Hunt to Raffles, September 1, 1814, *Java 26, Public Cons.*, December 22, 1814. See also Hunt to C. Assey, January 3, 1815, *Java 27, Public Cons.*, March 29, 1815; Hunt to Assey, April 21, 1815, *Java 28, Public Cons.*, April 21, 1815; and *Consultations* May 13, May 26 and June 9, 1815 in *Vol. 28*.

Hunt left Sooloo on August 26, and arrived at Sambuangan two days later. Here he received the permission of the Spanish governor to leave part of his force until his return from Canton on the *Greyhound*. Disaster, however, seems to have overtaken the ship shortly afterwards, for she had to be abandoned. Hunt was able to save the Company's consignment by shipping it on the Spanish *Victoria*, but on October 21 he was informed by the Spanish Board of Trade to remove his cargo from that ship because its destination had been changed. The *Thainstone* under the command of Captain Peters came to his aid, and a contract was signed whereby Peters agreed to carry him and his cargo to Canton for 5,000 dollars. The *Thainstone* soon encountered gales, and found it necessary on December 19, to put into Manila. Hunt landed his cargo, and informed Raffles that it would have to remain there until the arrival of junks from China in April. Despite his failure to convey Hunt to Canton, Peters claimed his money which Hunt refused to pay, claiming a breach of contract. The case went first before the Manila courts, but was eventually settled at the Recorder's Court at Penang.

When Raffles learnt of Hunt's failure to secure the commercial objects of his mission, he ordered one of the ships of the Macassar station to proceed to Sooloo or Manila and bring him back to Batavia. By March the Company ship *Ternate* was on its way northwards conveying Raffles's fresh instructions to Hunt to abandon "all further interference or intercourse with Sooloo and its neighbourhood..."<sup>133</sup> Hunt left Manila late in March and on April 21 he appeared again at Batavia where he handed over his accounts and papers relating to the mission. The Government stopped his allowances on April 30, and decided to auction those goods which he had brought back with him. Far from making the huge profits that he calculated, Raffles had to face a serious loss on the mission. Hunt's Sooloo expedition was therefore gently hushed up.

When he had despatched Hunt to Sooloo, Raffles had arrived at a fairly coherent policy for the Archipelago. At this time he directed a series of despatches both to Bengal and London in which he outlined his ideas. These ideas found their completest expression in a long Minute dated February 11, 1814. It is perhaps the most important despatch of its kind that Raffles ever sent home.

"The period is now arrived", he wrote,<sup>134</sup> "when it becomes necessary to decide upon the general policy which we shall pursue towards the

133 C. Assey to Hunt, January 30, 1815, *Java 42, Sep. and Political Dept.*, February 7, 1815. See also *Cons.* dated May 13, 1815.

134 There are many slightly varying versions of this Minute. I have followed the copy which he addressed to the Secret Committee in *Java 61, Part I.*

different Native States in these Seas....the policy uniformly recommended and adopted by this Government has been that of supporting the long established and acknowledged sovereigns, and of supporting order and subordination within their respective Empires as anciently established”.

Piracy had resulted from the establishment of minor chieftains in control of their own ports, and the only way to meet this situation was by establishing once again the power of the hereditary chieftains, if necessary under the superintendence of a European Resident.<sup>135</sup> He justified a forward policy in Borneo because the native states there had wanted a British connection. He stated again and again the first principle of his Archipelago policy.

It becomes incumbent to draw the line which shall distinguish the States in connexion with the British Government exclusively from [those] which have been immediately and formerly dependencies on the ruling power in Java. This is necessary to avert the possibility of these acquisitions of British Policy and arms being confounded and lost in any arrangements that may eventually take place.

The independent natives states which had been brought within the sphere of the British power ought, therefore, to be “entirely divested of any relation with Java”.

I cannot hesitate to record my opinion that it is now consistent with the honour, character and Interests of the British nation and of the East India Company in particular, and at the same time most conducive to an improvement in the condition and happiness of the Natives of these Islands, and to the extension of Commerce and Prosperity that these States should continue to be separated from the Political fate of Java....

If Java could not be annexed to the British crown then

it behoves us to adopt such measures while within our power as may establish a counterpoise to its importance and to the influence which the administration of Java must naturally give to its possessors. We must calculate that unless Establishments are now resolved on and fixed it may neither be consistent with the political rights of other countries nor practicable in effect to execute them hereafter....

While this Island is held by the East India Company the rule which I have laid down for my own conduct in separating as far as practicable the possessions exclusively British from those which fell into our hands as the immediate consequence of the conquest of Java may at all times enable the Supreme Government to draw the line. In the former case I have considered myself as continuing to act in my capacity as Political Agent for the Governor General in the Malay States—and in the latter as simply Lieutenant Governor of Java and the Dependencies attached to it at the Conquest. But contemplating the probability of Java being transferred to the Crown I am anxious to ascertain in what manner a provision is to be made for these States, and in particular

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135 Loc. cit.

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for such as have had long standing connections with the British Government where the East India Company possesses extensive Territory—as at Borneo Proper and the North Coast of Borneo.

As we have already seen, Borneo was regarded by Raffles as the mainstay of his plans in the Eastern Islands. But he had denied that either Garnham or Hunt's missions had been concerned with any extension of British territory. Yet he had admitted to Minto earlier that the island formed an exception to the general policy of forming settlements for trade only. No settlement in Borneo would succeed, he told his patron, which was "founded on a commercial instead of a territorial basis".<sup>136</sup> Raffles apparently thought that Dalrymple's Treaty, Forrest's cession, and John Jesse's agreement with the Sultan of Borneo Proper,<sup>137</sup> had already given the British territorial rights. These had only been confirmed by the arrangements made by Garnham and Hunt. But to view these cessions as "extensive" is somewhat puzzling, especially as he himself regarded Balembangan as a settlement suited only for trade.

It was only at Banjermassin that a settlement was formed on a territorial basis. This was because the Sultan ceded a large strip of his kingdom to Alexander Hare in October 1812.<sup>138</sup> Because of this, and because his friend Hare was in charge, Raffles engaged in a vigorous colonization scheme. During the five years he ruled Java, he supplied Hare with more than two thousand "criminals" to work on the latter's estates.<sup>139</sup> He had sent Javanese to colonize Carimon Java in November 1812, but this can hardly be viewed in the same light as the Banjermassin venture.<sup>140</sup> At Banjermassin he was attempting to build the kind of settlement which he had described to Minto, a settlement which would rival the power of the Dutch if ever they returned to Batavia.

The Banjermassin establishment resulted from the wishes of the Sultan. Despite his Dutch commitments he had made overtures to the Penang Government in 1797 for assistance in driving

136 Raffles to Minto, June 10, 1811, *Widow's Memoir*, 61. Brooke took this lesson to heart. See Templer; J. C., *The Private Letters of Sir James Brooke*, (London, 1853), I, 10.

137 See Willi, J., op. cit., 98; & *Oriental Repertory*, op. cit., II, 1-8.

138 *Java Government Gazette*, December 12, 1812.

139 The figure varies considerably. See (Baud, J. C.,) "De Bandjermasinsche Afschuwelijkheid", in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Ned.-Indie*. III, (N.S.), (1860), 1-25; Kemp, P. H. van der, "Het afbreken van onze betrekkingen met Bandjermasin onder Daendels en de herstelling van het Nederlandsch gezag aldaar op den 1 Januari 1817", in *Bijdragen*, 49, (1898), pp. 1 seq.; van Deventer, M. L., op. cit., xlv-xlvi; & Norman, H. D., *Levysohn*, op. cit., 98-102.

140 *Java Public Consultations*, February 26, 1813 & May 14, 1813 contain details of the Carimon Java Settlement.

out the Dutch,<sup>141</sup> but nothing was done until the Java expedition was about to sail from Malacca. Then Hare told Raffles that the Sultan had made "urgent invitations"<sup>142</sup> for him to settle in his territory, but he wished for the approval of the Government before committing himself. Raffles persuaded Minto to despatch Hare as an Agent to Banjermassin to superintend and endeavour to regulate the states along the Borneo coast.<sup>143</sup> When Hare was granted a large part of the Sultan's territory, Raffles considered that the British Government was firmly committed. As he explained to Minto in 1812, after he had outlined the advantages he saw in the British connection with Banjermassin:

I have been . . . particular in detailing for your Lordship's information every particular which it has been in my power to obtain respecting the possession of Banjer-Massing, considering that that Settlement is not so much to be occupied as a dependency attaching to the conquest of Java, but rather as accepted on the explicit and voluntary invitation to the British Government by a competent and acknowledged independent Native Authority.<sup>144</sup>

The greater the chances became of Java being restored to the Dutch, the more Raffles concentrated his hopes on Banjermassin. In the despatch to the Secret Committee of February, 1814, in which he called for a positive policy in the Archipelago, he drew particular attention to the Banjermassin Treaty,

The circumstances under which this connexion was formed, appear to me to preclude the possibility of its reverting to a foreign Power . . . the terms of our Treaty are decidedly different from those which subsisted with the Dutch. We have obtained a cession of Territory which though not immediately productive of Revenue, will afford extensive facility at any future proceedings to the improvement of the extensive and valuable Island of Borneo which Government may be inclined to contemplate.<sup>145</sup>

Raffles soon received despatches from Bengal which commented on his Borneo ventures. His proposal to establish Residents in the Islands was bitterly attacked,<sup>146</sup> and Garnham's mission condemned as

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141 Willi, J., *op. cit.*, 134.

142 Raffles to Secret Committee, February 11, 1814, *op. cit.* Raffles received two agents from the Sultan of Banjermassin while he was at Malacca, Raffles to Minto, January 31, 1811, *Raffles Collection*, II, 6.

143 *Loc. cit.*

144 Raffles to Minto, (n.d., but May 1, 1812), *Mackenzie Collection*, (Private), (India Office), 13, No. 7.

145 Raffles to Secret Committee, February 11, 1814, *op. cit.*

146 See various correspondence on the subject in "Raffles and the Indian Archipelago", *The Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, ed. Logan, J. R., I, (N.S.), (1856), 266-290.

liable to involve ultimately so heavy an expense, such a waste of Troops, and such important Political consequences as to require that they should be engaged in without the previous consent of this Government.<sup>147</sup>

He was ordered to

abstain from any measures which may place the Supreme Government in the dilemma of either prosecuting an attempt which may appear . . . impolitic, or of receding from such attempt[s] under circumstances which may be calculated to produce an embarrassment.<sup>148</sup>

Raffles had reported Hunt's mission to the Sooloo Islands to the Directors in February 1814, but he was careful to describe it as a commercial mission. In this disguise he suggested the "Establishment of a permanent Interest in the Islands to the North of Borneo",<sup>149</sup> as a means of supplementing the China trade. Raffles' defence of a British station in the Sooloo Islands was, therefore, the same as Dalrymple's fifty years previously.

Raffles's despatches on these subjects reached England in September 1814. In January of the following year the Board wrote bluntly to Hastings:

We have viewed with considerable anxiety the engagements proposed to be entered into by the Lieutenant Governor of . . . [Java] with Petty States in the Eastern Seas, and especially the Treaty he had actually concluded with the Rajah of Banjermassing. We are decidedly of opinion, that such engagements are impolitic, and injudicious; that they are calculated to involve the British Government in the internal concerns of those States, and the perpetual contests which they are carrying on with each other. It is also in our opinion extremely doubtful, whether partial connections with some of the Piratical States, is not more likely, upon the whole, to injure than promote commercial intercourse between our Settlements in India and the Eastern Islands.<sup>150</sup>

Further the Treaty concluded by Hare with the Sultan of Banjermassin was disavowed:

We consider it only in the light of a provisional arrangement, wanting every proper sanction to render it binding upon the British Government. At all events we direct that it be annulled, and that whatever establishment may have been formed in that settlement, should be immediately withdrawn, unless you should be of opinion that Mr. Raffles had been misinformed, and, that, in point of fact, the Dutch had not, as supposed by him, formally abandoned the connection with Banjermassing previous to the capture of Java . . .

147 Sec. Supreme Govt. to C. Assey, January 22, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, March 8, 1814.

148 Loc. cit.

149 Raffles to the Court of Directors, February 11, 1814, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, March 25, 1814.

150 Board to Gov.-General, January 9, 1815, *Board's Drafts of Secret Letters to India*, 5, 98.

Had the Island of Java and its dependencies remained permanently in our hands [they concluded], a different course with regard to our connection and intercourse with the Petty States in the Eastern Seas, might have been taken, from that which under present circumstances it would seem advisable to pursue.<sup>151</sup>

Before this unwelcome news reached the East, Raffles had come into fresh conflict with Bengal over his interference in Lingen and Rhio. The matter arose over the seizure of several Chinese boats, owned by one Chi Im of Penang, by the Company's cruizer *Aurora* whose Captain, as we have seen was under Raffles's orders. The Prince of Wales Island Government rightly protested at this interference in what they regarded as their sphere of influence.<sup>152</sup> The Supreme Government in a despatch of April 9, 1814 demanded to know on what grounds Raffles had ordered MacDonald to proceed to Rhio and Lingen.<sup>153</sup> In future, Raffles was told, all intercourse between Java and Rhio was to be conducted through Penang. Raffles justified his action on the grounds that such interference was the only way to enforce the monopoly of tin at Banca.<sup>154</sup> He did not mention his idea of establishing a Resident there, and he disavowed MacDonald's action in seizing the boats, and pleaded ignorance of the fact that Rhio and Lingen were within the sphere of the Prince of Wales Island Government. He asked for maturer deliberation by the Supreme Government on a proposal that Rhio and Lingen be placed under the authority of the Resident at Banca.<sup>155</sup>

Banca itself was considered by Raffles as an important link in his Archipelago policy. In May 1812 the island, together with Billiton, were ceded to the British by the Sultan of Palembang,<sup>156</sup> and the chief port of the island of Banca, called by the natives Minto, was changed to Minto, in honour of the Governor General. Thereafter Raffles engaged in a vigorous campaign to persuade Bengal and the Home authorities of the importance of the island, especially in possessing the monopoly of the island's tin supply. If the monopoly were continued he believed that Cornish tin could be shipped to China on more advantageous terms than previously.<sup>157</sup>

Before the cession had taken place Raffles told Minto that the harbour of Klabbat on Banca was "the most secure in

151 Loc. cit.

152 W. A. Clubley to G. Dowdeswell, February 2, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, August 4, 1814.

153 *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, August 4, 1814.

154 Raffles to Moira, August 4, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, August 4, 1814.

155 Loc. cit. As Lieut.-Gov. of Java, Raffles's policy regarding Lingen and Rhio was no doubt conditioned by the fact that Java was dependent on them for gambir. See *History of Java*, op. cit., I, 204.

156 Gillespie to Raffles, (n.d.), *Widow's Memoir*, 121.

157 Report on Banca, August 1, 1812, *Java* 60, (India Office).

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India,"<sup>158</sup> and the situation of Minta, "the most commanding that could be chosen for the Eastern Seas".<sup>159</sup> In October of 1812 he wrote to the Secret Committee, enclosing a report on Banca in which he argued that

if the course of events at home should ever oblige us to give up Java, we have in Banca a possession not 130 miles from it, with all the advantages we have enumerated to which we can lay claim, and one too that will render us so large a surplus of revenue.<sup>160</sup>

Raffles claimed later that he had administered Banca on "the principle of its being permanently British",<sup>161</sup> and that he did not contemplate it ever being restored to the Dutch. But Lord Minto had attempted to cool his ardour in 1812 when he pointed out that although

the acquisition of a station in the geographical position of Banca unburdened with the claims of any European nation and in so far less dependent on the eventual results of a general peace, may be an object of reasonable policy, we are disposed to admit. But in the first place it is not manifest that any rights of dominion, which may flow to us from the Sultan of Palembang, whether by cession or conquest, will not be claimed by a future sovereign of Java, as an inseparable appendage of that colony, and if Great Britain should negotiate with France either in such circumstances or in such a spirit, as should induce the restitution of Java, and consequently the Moluccos, she would not be likely to stop at the surrender of an acquisition so much inferior in value and consequence as Banca.<sup>162</sup>

As it was, Banca was returned to the Dutch in 1814 in exchange for Cochin on the Indian continent.<sup>163</sup> Until that time the Island of Billiton had not received Raffles's special attention, and it was not until after the founding of Singapore that he formulated any coherent plans for it.<sup>164</sup>

Early in 1814, when Raffles was coming into serious conflict with Bengal over his measures in the Eastern Seas, and his conduct of the Java administration,<sup>165</sup> it would have been infinitely better

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158 Raffles to Minto, March 7, 1812, *Widow's Memoir*, 112.

159 *Loc. cit.*

160 Raffles to the Secret Committee, October, 1812, enclos. Raffles to Minto, August 4, 1812, *Java* 60.

161 Raffles, Sir T. S., *Statement of the Services of Sir Stamford Raffles*, (London, 1824), 18.

162 Cited by Kemp, P. H., van der, "Fendall's en Raffles' opvattingen in het algemeen omtrent het Londensch Tractaat van 13 Augustus 1814", in *Bidragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Ned.-Indie*, 47, (1897), 437, note 66.

163 Renier, G. J., *Great Britain and the Establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1813-1815*, (London, 1930), 332.

164 Report on the Island of Billiton, November 27, 1819, *Raffles Collection*, IV, 28.

165 See the volume of *Gillespie Documents*.

for him if he had proceeded cautiously with his plans for building an Island Empire. Unfortunately for him, he was forced to take active measures in Bali and at Macassar.

Before the Java invasion Raffles regarded Bali as a state friendly to the British.<sup>166</sup> Moreover, as the Island had never been conquered by the Dutch he believed that any connections which were formed with the chiefs there would be "likely to survive any arrangements which might be the consequence of a peace in Europe".<sup>167</sup> Raffles had visited the Island,<sup>168</sup> and had concluded that a more rigid control was necessary if the slave trade there was to be reduced. However, the earlier friendly disposition of the Rajah of Bali Baliling had changed at the beginning of 1814, when a ship of the Company was seized by him,<sup>169</sup> and some of his people had made a raid on the district of Banuwangi in eastern Java.<sup>170</sup> An English lieutenant and a small party of Sepoys had no difficulty in driving the invaders off,<sup>171</sup> but Raffles clearly had to take some punitive action. The reasons given for unrest in Bali was the diminution of the Rajah's revenues caused by the abolition of the slave trade, and the regulation of the opium trade.<sup>172</sup>

The Java Government decided to collect a force at Sourabaya under Major General Nightingall, and despatch them to Bali if necessary<sup>173</sup> By the middle of April, Nightingall had decided to attack Bali Baliling,<sup>174</sup> and Raffles gave his consent, at the same time hoping that military operations would not be necessary.<sup>175</sup> Nightingall was warned that on no account was he to appoint a British Agent there, because of the objections which Bengal had raised to the appointment of Residents in the Islands.<sup>176</sup> The only occasion on which an Agent could be left was in the event of the chiefs of Bali specifically requesting one.<sup>177</sup> Raffles at this time was proceeding cautiously, and warned Nightingall that any treaties agreed to with the native states should be on the general basis of amity and peace. He was on no occasion to

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166 Raffles to Minto, (n.d.), *Widow's Memoir*, 32.

167 *Loc. cit.*

168 *Ibid.*, 172.

169 *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, March 8, 1814. See also March, 16, and March 30.

170 *Loc. cit.*, & *Java Government Gazette*, April 9, 1814.

171 *Loc. cit.*

172 *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, March 16, 1814, & *Java Govt. Gazette*, April 9, 1814.

173 *Loc. cit.* See van Deventer, M. L., *op. cit.*, xli-xliii.

174 Nightingall to Raffles, April 17, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, June 1, 1814.

175 Raffles to Nightingall, April 25, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, June 1, 1814.

176 *Loc. cit.*

177 *Loc. cit.*

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sign a treaty which would bind the British to any "promises of assistance as may involve us in the petty disputes of the Island".<sup>178</sup>

Nightingall set out for Bali with his force of 3,000 men on May 12, and arrived at Bali Baliling two days later. The Rajah, Wayang Carang Asseem, expressed his great sorrow for the actions of hostility, which he blamed on his brother over whom he had no control.<sup>179</sup> He permitted Nightingall to enter his craton and was forgiven. Hostages were placed in Nightingall's hands as a security against his future good conduct, and on May 19 Nightingall reported to Raffles that peace once again reigned.

The humblest subject of Great Britain will now find favour and protection on Baliling, and affairs are left on so favourable a footing that they are open to any arrangement that competent authority may deem it either beneficial or necessary.<sup>180</sup>

By December of the same year Raffles thought that the time had come, because of repeated misunderstandings between Batavia and Bali Baliling,<sup>181</sup> to appoint a Resident on the Island. The erratic Dr. Ainslie was therefore appointed as "agent of [the] Government with the States of Bali and the adjacent Islands, extending from Bali to the outsettlements now dependant on the Residency of Macassar".<sup>182</sup> The appointment was not only designed to promote harmonious relations between Java and Bali, but showed in the clearest way Raffles's policy of preparing for a Dutch return to the Archipelago. Ainslie's instructions read:<sup>183</sup>

Contemplating the probable return of these Colonies [Java and its dependencies] to the Dutch Government it is important to uphold the British Interests with these States. In your communications therefore you will appear rather as the British Agent [than] as the Agent of the Colonial Government, and you will endeavour to preserve the delicate distinction considering the connection with the States of Bali as a matter that may hereafter be made use of when these Islands may have reverted to a foreign power without bringing into view an immediate connexion with this Island.

As early as 1811 Raffles had seen the importance of Banca, Bali and Celebes in building up a centre of opposition to the Dutch.

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178 Loc. cit.

179 Nightingall to Raffles, May 19, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, June 1, 1814.

180 Loc. cit. See also *Java Government Gazette*, June 4, 1814.

181 *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, December 6, 1814.

182 Loc. cit.

183 Instructions to Dr. Ainslie, December 12, 1814, *Sep. Depend. Cons.*, December 12, 1814.

By fixing ourselves in Banca, Bali, Celebes, and Jelolo, we should have a chain of posts which would prevent the enemy entirely from attaining very formidable power, or deriving his former advantages from the possession of Java and the Moluccas. . . .<sup>184</sup>

When signs of unrest appeared in Celebes therefore,<sup>185</sup> Raffles decided on swift measures. Following the expedition against Bali, Nightingall was instructed to proceed to Macassar to deal with the troublesome Rajah of Boni.<sup>186</sup> The latter had shown signs of hostility to the British apparently for the same reasons as the Rajah of Bali Baliling.<sup>187</sup> He had also attempted to increase his sphere of influence, had intimidated the Resident at Maros, and some of his followers had murdered a native interpreter in British employ.<sup>188</sup> Nightingall arrived at Macassar early in June, and on the 6th sent a letter to the Rajah demanding that he acknowledge British supremacy in Celebes, and forgo his claims over the other native chiefs in the Islands. He was given ten hours in which to hand over the Regalia of Macassar, and on his refusal to do this, Nightingall stormed his palace.<sup>189</sup> With the help of John Crawford, Nightingall soon restored peace in the Rajah's territories.

### III

Although Raffles was fully prepared for the return of the Dutch to the Islands, and founded his Archipelago policy on that assumption, in the early years at any rate this was regarded as a precautionary measure only. For in 1812 and 1813 Raffles held strong hopes that Java would be retained either by the Company or the Crown, and he displayed great energy in attempting to persuade the Home authorities of the value of the island.

To the obvious disadvantage of Bengal, he had outlined a plan to the Chairman of Directors in October 1812, by which British manufactured cloths were to be imported into Java.

"Cloths from Western India", he wrote,<sup>190</sup> "have. . . always formed an important branch in the Commerce of Java, and it occurs to me that in the present state of the manufacturing interests in England, a very material portion of this trade might with advantage be transferred to England, where the cloths might be manufactured even at a lower rate than in India, it being. . . in the coarser rather than the finer sorts, that the bulk of the Trade consists".

184 Raffles to Minto, June 10, 1811, *Widow's Memoir*, 70.

185 *Java Government Gazette*, July 16, 1814.

186 *Loc. cit.*

187 *Ibid.*, April 9, 1814.

188 Nightingall to his Highness the Rajah of Boni, *Ibid.*, July 16, 1814.

189 Nightingall to Raffles, June 8, 1814, *Loc. cit.*

190 Letter dated October 29, 1812, *Java*, 60, Part II. When British cotton goods did arrive in Java they proved unsatisfactory. *History of Java*, *op. cit.*, I, 216.

Java was also to be a centre for the distribution of Chinese goods to Americans and Europeans if free trade were permitted in the Islands,<sup>191</sup> for Java produce was readily saleable in Canton.<sup>192</sup> By the time that free trade was permitted in the Islands, Raffles had woven these into a coordinated plan. Because of its "peculiar situation" Java was to be both "the depot for the produce of the Eastern Islands...and for the sale of British Manufactures".<sup>193</sup> However the Directors, to whom this plan was outlined, showed no interest. They no longer saw the necessity of a triangular trade with Canton, as Dalrymple had suggested many years previously.

#### IV

The attitude of the Company towards Java must have exerted a considerable influence on the Government. The Secret Committee of Correspondence which sat at the end of 1813 to consider the forthcoming peace negotiations, informed the Government that of the Dutch colonies taken in the East, the Cape and Ceylon should be held in preference to Java and the Moluccas.<sup>194</sup> The Company never ceased to regret that it had been forced into Java.<sup>195</sup>

The Government, on the other hand, was prepared at first to view the conquest somewhat differently, and Java was to be taken over as a Crown colony. Bathurst told Buckinghamshire in October 1813 that he had recommended this course of action to the Prince Regent.<sup>196</sup>

Why the decision was never implemented is not clear, although the date of Bathurst's letter suggests that it was the cessation of hostilities which caused its abandonment. This conclusion is supported by a despatch which was sent to Hastings in May 1815.

For some time after the conquest of that Island, it was a question whether the Government should remain with the Company, or be

191 Raffles to W. Ramsay, January 8, 1813, *Widow's Memoir*, 185.

192 *Loc. cit.*

193 Raffles to Court of Directors, June 30, 1813, *Java*, 60. See also his letter to the Directors dated February 11, 1814, *Sep. Dept. Proc.*, March 25, 1814.

194 Minutes of the Secret Committee of Correspondence, December 31, 1813.

195 See letter of Directors to Lord Bathurst, October 25, 1816, in van Deventer, M. L., *op. cit.*, 115.

196 Bathurst to Buckinghamshire, October 26, 1813, cited by Kemp, P. H., van der, "De sluiting van het Londonsch tractaat van 13 Augustus 1814", in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Ned.-Indie*, 47, (1897), 281 note 2.

transferred to the Crown; and when a decision had been formed in favour of the latter arrangement, events took place in Europe which rendered it probable that the Island might soon be safely restored to its ancient possessor. . . .<sup>197</sup>

Soon the British Government was engaged in negotiations with the Dutch concerning the return of their colonies. The Stadhouder had directed in February 1795, that the Dutch colonial authorities surrender to the English as friends, but none of the local governments had obeyed. The result was that the Dutch colonies had fallen to the British by right of conquest.<sup>198</sup> The Dutch themselves realised that they had no legal claim for restoration of their possessions,<sup>199</sup> and depended on the goodwill of the British Government. Castlereagh depicted this goodwill as "a desire, almost romantic, to serve Holland",<sup>200</sup> but there was a stronger desire on the part of the British to fashion again a workable Balance of Power on the continent. For this purpose an independent Dutch nation was considered to be essential. On the return of the Dutch colonies, the British cabinet adopted the following principle:

If the maritime power of France shall be restricted within due bounds by the efficient establishment of Holland, the Peninsula and Italy in security and independence, Great Britain consistent with her own security may then be induced to apply the greater proportion of her conquests to promote the general interests. If on the contrary the arrangement should be defective in any of these points, Great Britain must reserve a proportionable share of those conquests to render her secure against France<sup>201</sup>

From this a somewhat circuitous principle developed in Castlereagh's negotiations. To build a strong and united Netherlands the restoration of her colonies was essential, but Holland would have to be strong before Britain could restore her possessions. In 1813 he proposed to the allied ministers that all Dutch colonies should be restored with the exception of the Cape, "provided Holland could be rendered. . . effectually independent of France".<sup>202</sup> But Liverpool, while he agreed with this principle, was not prepared to apply it in the case of the West Indian colonies, which he thought were "purely commercial" possessions,

197 The letter is dated May 5, 1815. Cited by Kemp, P. H., van der, "Fendall's en Raffles' opvattingen". op. cit., 420-1.

198 Renier, G. J., op. cit., 318.

199 Ibid., 319-320.

200 Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty, July 14, 1814, in van Deventer, M. L., op. cit., 37

201 Memorandum of Cabinet, December 26, 1813, in Colenbrander, H. T., *Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840*, (The Hague, 1914), VII, 16.

202 Cited by Renier, G. J., op. cit., 321.

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but only with regard to the East Indies which were "points of strength and empire",<sup>203</sup> However this position was never seriously advanced, for soon pressure was being brought to bear on the Government by West Indian interests, especially the port of Liverpool,<sup>204</sup> for the retention of Demerara, Berbice and Essenquibo. By April the enlarged British demands began to worry Castlereagh.

"I still feel great doubts" he confided to Liverpool,<sup>205</sup> "about the acquisition in sovereignty of so many Dutch colonies. I am sure our reputation on the continent, as a feature of strength, power and confidence, is of more real moment to us than an acquisition thus made."

The official negotiations between the Dutch and the British began in London in July 1814. Although the former remained suspicious, Castlereagh's threat to transfer negotiations to Vienna, allowed good sense to prevail. The British demands in the West Indies and for the Cape drew attention away from the Eastern possessions. Castlereagh demanded the Cape because of a "prejudice" which he said existed in England for its retention, even though he thought that it was not an important commercial acquisition.<sup>206</sup> But the prejudice was not wholly shared by British parliamentarians, some of whom argued that it should be restored to the Dutch.<sup>207</sup> In the East, Holland was returned Java and its dependencies, the Moluccas, and the Island of Banca. This latter was exchanged for Cochin in India, because the Banca tin mines, according to Castlereagh, "embarrass us somewhat with our Cornish subjects...."<sup>208</sup> Billiton, however, remained in British hands.

The news of the Treaty reached Java early in 1815, and Raffles prepared for its abandonment. But Napoleon's sudden return to France gave him a fresh opportunity to influence the Government, and he immediately sent public and private letters to the Earl of Buckinghamshire urging him to retain Java as a British possession.<sup>209</sup> But not placing much hope on these des-

203 Lord Liverpool to Lord Clancarty, January 21, 1814, in Colenbrander, H. T., *op. cit.*, VII, 31.

204 See "The Memorial of the subscribers, being planters, merchants, and others, resident in Liverpool, interested and employed in trading with the colonies of Demerara, Berbice and Essquibo", addressed to Lord Castlereagh, in Colenbrander, H. T., *Ibid.*, 143-146; & Renier, G. J., *op. cit.*, 325-6.

205 Letter dated April 19, 1814, cited by Renier, G. J., *op. cit.*, 323.

206 Castlereagh to Clancarty, July 30, 1814, in Colenbrander, H. T., *op. cit.*, VII, 168.

207 See *Ibid.*, pp. Lxi-Lxii.

208 Castlereagh to Clancarty, July 30, 1814, *Ibid.*, 169.

209 Raffles to the Earl of Buckinghamshire, August 5, 1815, in *Widow's Memoir*, pp. 252 seq.

patches, he began to fall back upon his second line of defence — Banjermassin. On April 21, 1815 he wrote to Hare<sup>210</sup> asking for full information regarding the settlement,

and the expence that would have to be incurred either in maintaining the present Settlement and promoting its influence within its immediate Sphere, or in extending that influence to the neighbouring State, and establishing it as the centre of a future British Power in these Seas. . . .

Before a reply was received, the British Government's own plans regarding the restoration of the Dutch colonies had undergone a modification due to Napoleon's return. On May 5, a despatch was sent to Hastings explaining that because of the events in Europe, it was

out of the power of the Netherlands to spare any portion of its force for the occupation of its Asiatic Colonies; and until a more settled order of things shall be established, the Island of Java and its dependencies must remain in the custody of the British Government.<sup>211</sup>

Three weeks later Castlereagh told Fagel of this decision.<sup>212</sup>

When Nahuys arrived at Batavia on March 5, 1816, as the forerunner of the Commissioners-General, he found not only the administration undergoing a change, but Fendall, who had replaced Raffles, was not at all certain that Java was to be handed back to the Dutch. Two months later when the Commissioners themselves arrived, Fendall had still received no instructions to relinquish his authority.<sup>213</sup> The delay caused in handing over the Island and its dependencies caused much ill-will between the English and the Dutch.

Fendall had his own ideas on how the Dutch should be handled, and what should be returned to them. Banjermassin became the most difficult of the problems to solve during the subsequent negotiations. Only three days after he had assumed control of the Java Government, Fendall suggested to Bengal that Hare's settlement was not adequately covered by the 1814 treaty.<sup>214</sup> Although the treaty provided that the Dutch would be returned all territories which were in their possession at the Peace of Amiens, Fendall argued that this provision could not apply to Banjermassin because the Dutch had formerly abandoned it. He suggested as a compromise that both the nations should

210 Raffles to Hare, April 21, 1815, *Java*, 42.

211 Cited by Kemp, P. H. van der, "Fendall's en Raffles' opvattingen", *op. cit.*, 421.

212 Renier, G. J., *op. cit.*, 336.

213 See Fendall to Gov.-Gen., March 23, 1816; Hastings to Bathurst, June 19, 1817 & Adam to Assey, May 18, 1816 in Kemp, P. H., van der, "Fendall's en Raffles' opvattingen" etc., *op. cit.*, 345, 429, 489-90.

214 Fendall to Moira, March 15, 1816, *Ibid.*, 483-4.

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withdraw from there, and the Dutch formally declare the validity of Daendels's act of abandonment.<sup>215</sup> Bengal was inclined to agree with this reasoning. Although no official order had been received by the Supreme Government for the handing over of the Dutch possessions, Hastings nevertheless thought that in the case of Banjermassin this should not be surrendered like the other dependencies because of "the tenor of our engagements with the native prince of that place".<sup>216</sup> On September 3, Fendall, acting on this advice, informed the Dutch Commissioners that he could not restore the Banjermassin settlement to them as it stood.<sup>217</sup> The Dutch argued that Daendels's withdrawal from there in 1809 had been only a matter of military strategy, and did not in the least constitute abandonment. Fendall replied that he would send a British Commission to Banjermassin to withdraw the settlers, but he argued that the British would "retain any rights . . . acquired, by the present settlement . . . and by the Treaty with the Sultan . . ." <sup>218</sup> However on November 9, the British Commission formally restored to the Sultan all rights granted by him four years previously,<sup>219</sup> and the last British settlement at Banjermassin withdrew.

In vain did Hare argue that he had occupied Banjermassin as a private individual, at the express invitation of the Sultan.<sup>220</sup> Hare's strategy had always been, as Clunies Ross explained later,<sup>221</sup> to make the settlement independent of Java, and inexpensive to the Company.

He was fully persuaded (Ross wrote), that if this were done the British Territories in Borneo would most certainly be retained and he had no idea that they would in any event be abandoned.

This had been Raffles's belief also, and the evacuation of the British settlement from there must have caused him much sorrow. But whatever his faults, Raffles never understood defeat. Within a few months of his arrival at Bencoolen he began again to lay his plans for a British Empire dominating the Eastern Seas, and attempted once more to create an interest in the Island of

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215 Loc. cit.

216 Adam to Assey, May 18, 1816, op. cit., 494.

217 Kemp, P. H., van der, "Het afbreken van onze betrekkingen met Bandjermassin" etc., op cit., 114-5.

218 Ibid., 118.

219 *Java*, 66.

220 Kemp, P. H., van der, "Het afbreken" etc., 110.

221 Extracts from a Journal kept by John Clunies Ross, *Raffles Collection*, XIV, (pub. *JMBRAS*, 25, (4 & 5): 120-8).

Borneo.<sup>222</sup> But the Company and the British nation were not interested,<sup>223</sup> and it remained for James Brooke to carry Raffles's ideals into Borneo many years later.

### Errata

*JMBRAS*, 26, (1), July 1953: 81-85

Page 81: line 9 should read "an historian has recently....."

Page 82: line 30 should read "England's Colonial Empire which balanced France's "universal dominion" in Europe."

Page 83: line 18 "country" should read "island."

----- line 23 should read "strong feelings of surprize and displeasure....."

----- line 42 quotation marks should precede "unaided."

----- footnote 8 should be preceded by the word "See."

----- footnote 9 should read "Despatches to Bengal, (Public Department)....."

Page 84: line 1 should read "and of employing....."

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222 Raffles to the Secret Committee, July 3, 1818, in van Deventer, M. L., *op. cit.*, 258.

223 There was a unanimity of opinion against the establishment of settlements in Borneo. The Directors wrote to the Board on May 5, 1815: "We have much pleasure in perceiving so near a coincidence in the view taken by your Government and in the opinion which we entertain respecting the plans meditated by the Lieutenant Governor of Java for forming new Establishments in the Eastern Archipelago, and we are more especially pleased to find that you have annulled the engagements entered into by the Colonial Government with the Native Chiefs of Borneo". *Letters from the Court of Directors to the Board, (India Office)*, 69.